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How Horizon and Vigil were tested, and where they fail

We publish the models, the test numbers and the cases they miss. All of our figures come from AI-written test chats, not from real children’s messages, so read them as a starting point.

What leaves the phone
Sent to parent
Category and a one-sentence reason
Message text
Stayed on the phone
Sent to SafeCircle
The short alert only, over an encrypted connection

Horizon and Vigil

Horizon is our risk model. It reads a conversation on the child’s Android phone and returns a risk level from none to critical, one or more of seven categories, and a one-sentence reason. Horizon Mobile is the small version that ships in the child app. Horizon Full is a larger version for research and servers, and it is not sent to phones.

Vigil is a newer research classifier for the same seven categories. It scores each category instead of writing a reason. The child app does not use it and it creates no alerts for parents. You can try it in the AI Playground app.

Neither model has been measured on real children’s conversations. The test chats were written by AI models, and the risk labels came from the same generation step.

Figures from the Vigil repository’s head-to-head report dated 1 October 2026, which scored both models with the same code, on the same chats, on one server CPU. Phone figures are speed and memory only.

The numbers

  • 93.9%Risky chats caught, Horizon’s own sampleHorizon Mobile INT8, with the correct category. This sample comes from the same kind of generator as its training data.
  • 62.6–67.7%Risky chats caught, chats from other AI modelsChats written by Llama 3.1 8B and Qwen3 8B, which Horizon never saw. The correct category is required.
  • 20%–21%Harmless chats flagged, unseen chatsOn the same unseen chats. Our target is 2%.
  • About 10%Answers that could not be read, unseen chatsOn one unseen set. The app treats an unreadable answer as no risk and sends nothing.
  • 89.4%–93.0%Vigil risky chats caught, unseen chatsVigil research model, on the same unseen chats. It flags 11.6% to 17.1% of harmless ones.
  • 60Android phones and tablets benchmarkedFor speed and memory: 31 high-end, 22 mid-range and 7 low-end devices. Accuracy on phones was not measured.

Models

Weights are public on Hugging Face under the SafeCircle Research License, described below.

ModelBase modelSize and formatStatusLicenseWhere to get it
Horizon Mobile (INT8)Gemma 3 1B InstructLiteRT-LM, about 1.2 GBIn the child app, Full tierSafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0)Hugging Face
Horizon Mobile (INT4)Gemma 3 1B InstructLiteRT-LM, about 0.7 GBIn the child app, Lite tierSafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0)Hugging Face
Horizon FullLlama 3.2 3B InstructSafetensorsResearch, not on phonesSafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0)Hugging Face
Horizon Full (GGUF)Horizon FullGGUF: Q4_K_M, Q5_K_M, Q8_0, f16Research, for llama.cpp and OllamaSafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0)Hugging Face
Horizon Edge 4BGemma 4 E4B InstructLiteRT-LM, several variantsIn AI PlaygroundSafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0)Hugging Face
VigilLaya-multilingual encoder, 322M parametersSafetensors, GGUF, TFLiteResearch preview, not in the child appSafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0)Hugging Face

License: research use only

The weights are released under the SafeCircle Research License (SRL-1.0). It allows research, education and non-commercial use. It does not allow using the models, or anything derived from them, to harm minors, building systems that evade child-safety detection, or commercial use without written permission. This is not an open-source license.

For commercial licensing, or to report misuse, write to legal@safecircle.tech. The child app asks the user to accept this license before it downloads a model.

Datasets and evaluation

The training data is synthetic. Language models wrote the conversations, varying the child’s age, the platform and the relationship. According to our documentation, no real children’s messages were used. The risk labels came from the generation step, not from human annotators.

The training dataset is not public, and there is no public dataset on Hugging Face yet.

Evaluation uses held-out synthetic chats from the training generator, and separately chats written by other AI models. There is no human-written test set yet, which is the largest gap in the evidence.

Warning

Known limitations

Horizon and Vigil have not been tested on real children’s conversations. They miss some risky chats and flag some harmless ones, especially on text from sources they did not learn from. Do not treat an alert, or the absence of one, as the only safeguard.

  • No real-world measurement. Every accuracy figure here comes from AI-written test chats.
  • Other AI-written text. On chats from other generators, Horizon caught 62.6% to 67.7% of risky chats and flagged about 20% of harmless ones.
  • Severity. Telling high from critical is the weakest part. Recall for critical was about 53% on the held-out set.
  • Threats and grooming. On unseen text, recall for threats fell to about 4 to 5%, and recall for grooming fell to between 36% and 58%.
  • Friendly teasing. About half of a test scene about friends joking was flagged.
  • Languages. Training targets English and Spanish. There are no published per-language results, and other languages should be treated as unsupported.
  • Coverage. The child app reads five apps and only text on screen. Images, voice and video are not analysed.
  • Sampling. Each app is checked at most once every five minutes, using the last ten visible text snippets.
  • Failures are silent. If the model fails to load or returns an unreadable answer, the app sends nothing.

Reproduce it

  1. Download the weights and read the model cards at Hugging Face.
  2. Read the technical paper (PDF) at safecircle.tech.
  3. Read the method notes and limitations in the Horizon models documentation.
  4. The GGUF files run with llama.cpp and compatible runtimes.

Training code and evaluation scripts are not public yet, so this page cannot take you through re-running training or the evaluation.

Cite us

Palma Sánchez, T. (2026). Horizon: Privacy-Preserving On-Device Child Safety Risk Detection via Knowledge Distillation. SafeCircle. Technical paper.

Work with us

We would welcome outside review: researchers who can test on human-written chats, teachers and counsellors who can tell us where alerts help or mislead, and engineers who want to check the phone numbers. Please do not send us real children’s messages.

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